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Abstract: Several authors have suggested that a particular managerial 
component was needed before cost accounting could be fully used for 
accountability and disciplinary purposes. They argue that the mar-
riage of managerialism and accounting first occurred in the United 
States at the Springfield Armory after 1840. They generally downplay 
the quality and usefulness of cost accounting at the New England 
textile mills before that time and call for a re-examination of original 
mill records from a disciplinary perspective. 
This paper reports the results of such a re-examination. It initially 
describes the social and economic environment of U.S. textile manu-
facturing in New England in the early nineteenth century. Selected 
cost memos and reports are described and analyzed to indicate the 
nature and scope of costing undertaken at the mills in Lowell, Massa-
chusetts, in the late 1820s and early 1830s. The paper discusses how 
particular cost information was used and speculates why certain 
more modern procedures were not adopted. Its major finding is that 
cost management practices fully measured up to the business com-
plexities, economic pressures, and social forces of the day. 
Several recent studies of nineteenth century cost manage-
ment1 [Hoskin and Macve, 1988; Ezzamel, Hoskin and Macve, 
1990] have suggested that a particular managerial component 
was needed before cost accounting could be fully used by 
owner/managers for accountability and disciplinary purposes. 
This research was financially supported by St. John Fisher College's Sum-
mer Grant Program. 
1 The expression "cost management" best describes the use of cost informa-
tion by nineteenth century mill owners and managers. The terms "cost manage-
ment", "cost accounting", and "cost keeping" all generally represent the use of 
cost-based information to assist management and are used interchangeably 
throughout the paper. 
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According to the authors, the marriage of managerialism and 
accounting first occurred at the Springfield Armory after 1840 
once West Point-trained managers were firmly in place. The 
authors acknowledge that cost management was conducted at 
the U.S. textile mills before that time, but question its overall 
importance and ability to differentiate skill levels or establish 
accountability over workers and their production. They also call 
for a re-examination of the original records from a "disciplin-
ary" perspective [Hoskin and Macve, 1988, p. 71]. 
This study pursues this challenge by re-examining the na-
ture and environment of cost accounting at the cotton textile 
mills in Lowell, Massachusetts, during the 1820s and early 
1830s. Primary documents and secondary source material are 
analyzed to arrive at an interpretation of cost management 
practices during that time. Analysis indicates that cost informa-
tion was fully utilized by mill owners and managers and, in 
conjunction with other disciplinary and social factors, provided 
critical information needed to run the businesses profitably. The 
absence of certain accounting procedures, including methodical 
depreciation and norm-based standard costing, are best viewed 
as reflecting business complexities, economic pressures, and so-
cial forces of the day rather than as deficiencies awaiting a par-
ticular managerial component or further technical development. 
The paper initially describes the environment of U.S. textile 
manufacturing with special attention given to the Lowell-type 
mills in the 1820s and early 1830s. The Lowell mills in the 1820s 
and 1830s have been characterized as "the most technologically 
advanced factories in the nation" [Dublin, 1979, p. 68]. Social 
and economic factors within this environment are discussed to 
illustrate why certain costing procedures were implemented and 
how cost information may have been used. Surviving examples 
of cost memos and reports are then described to indicate the 
nature of costing that was undertaken at that time. 
THE ENVIRONMENT OF TEXTILE MANUFACTURING2 
Textile manufacturing in New England during the early 
1800s exemplifies the transition from mercantile to industrial 
2 Primary source material for this study was obtained at three locations: the 
Massachusetts Historical Society (MHS) and Harvard University's Baker Library 
(Baker), both in Boston, MA, and the Museum of American Textile History 
(MATH) in North Andover, MA. 
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accounting in the United States [Porter, 1980] and is representa-
tive of the industry that first embarked on large-scale factory 
production in America.3 Aided by the rapid diffusion of technol-
ogy from England [Jeremy, 1981], factory production of cotton 
textiles in New England took one of two general forms. In 
Rhode Island and Connecticut, Samuel Slater built small mills 
that were organized as partnerships, which were personally 
managed by owners, utilized family labor, and maintained the 
putting-out system (hereafter, "the Slater system"). Lowell-type 
mills were more than ten times larger than the typical mill in 
the Slater system [Dublin, 1979]. In Massachusetts, a group of 
Boston merchants formed joint-stock corporations, hired pro-
fessional managers, and produced textiles in large, fully inte-
grated factories (hereafter, "the Lowell system"). Both systems 
required the participation of New England labor that was unac-
customed to factory life and periodically in short supply [Prude, 
1983].4 
Factory work in the early nineteenth century entailed six 
day, 72-84 hour work weeks in harsh environments where ill-
ness and injury were commonplace [Luther, 1970]. The degree 
of labor's complicity with industrial capitalism and the level of 
owners' willful exploitation of labor are contentious issues that 
do not clearly illuminate the nature and development of cost 
management in the cotton textile industry 5 Social and eco-
3 Alfred Chandler [1977] discusses the McLane Report of 1832 which de-
scribed the current state of American manufacturing. Eighty-eight of the 106 
companies having assets greater than $100,000 were in the textile industry. 
Textile manufacturing represented a similar proportion of firms with assets 
between $50,000 and $100,000 and of enterprises employing more than 250 
workers. 
4 Ware [1966] mentions that mill owners had to overcome the prejudice 
against factory work and the fact that western lands were available and afford-
able to New Englanders. 
5 Mathews [1991] and Morone [1991] discuss tension between self-interest 
and the common good that characterized the transition to industrial capitalism. 
Thompson [1967] and Jeremy [1990] provide differing perspectives on this tran-
sition. Regarding mill workers' complicity, Dublin [1979, p. 79] concluded 
"There is little evidence, in the 1820s and 1830s at least, that women workers 
resented regulation of their conduct by the corporations. Their letters and remi-
niscences are notably free of complaints on this score." According to Tucker 
[1984, p. 172, 173], "the home became another training ground for a generation 
of factory hands. Lessons taught there stressed the implicit, unquestioning obe-
dience and deference to authority deemed necessary for good family and gov-
ernment, for a well-ordered society, and for the successful operation of the 
factory system." 
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nomic forces and the shifting balance of power between work-
ers and owner/managers better explain all phases of the work 
environment including cost management procedures.6 
The Slater System 
Samuel Slater began producing yarns and threads in Rhode 
Island in the 1790s. In order to induce farm families to live and 
work in his factory communities, Slater maintained traditional 
church and family values and a paternalistic social structure. 
Males were given custody for all family wages and were not 
forced to compete directly against women and children in low 
status, machine-tending positions. Supervisory and authority 
positions were also limited exclusively to males. Factory super-
visors continually reinforced the complementary virtues of in-
dustrial discipline and Puritanism (regularly, sobriety, punctual-
ity, obedience, and self-improvement) in their roles as church 
elders.7 These values generally appealed to mill operatives and, 
until the mid 1830s, were accepted by them out of moral obliga-
tion [Tucker, 1984]. 
The Slater system's initial reliance on paternalism comple-
mented its work force and underlying social structure and may 
have forestalled the use of cost accounting as a control device.8 
According to Prude [1983, p. 117]: 
. . . the bookkeeping iconography of these mills reveals 
further efforts to acknowledge conventional household 
6 Over time under both systems, increasing mechanization led to a deper-
sonalized, machine-paced environment [Prude, 1983]. Production was con-
stantly stretched out (workers had to tend more machines) and speeded up 
(workers had to produce more goods in a given time period) in order to main-
tain profits in light of steadily falling prices and increasing competition 
[Roediger and Foner, 1989]. The severity of output requirements and piece-rate 
reductions, and the enforcement of written regulations depended on economic 
forces (level of competition, supply of labor, etc.) and resulted in varying de-
grees of worker resistance. 
7 Tucker [1984, p. 170] emphasized the common social structure underlying 
church and factory: "Many values, including punctuality, attention to duty, and 
seriousness of purpose, were neatly summarized in the Webster Sabbath school 
constitution, which was drawn up by local church officials. The constitution 
was in fact a code of conduct similar to that maintained in the factory." 
8 Accounting records at the Slater mills were not examined directly. Tucker 
has researched these records extensively and in a personal telephone conversa-
tion with the author reported the failure to locate any significant cost account-
ing reports dating before the 1830s. 
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relationships and hierarchies . . . Such policies helped 
assured the viability of families inside local factory 
compounds. 
The hegemony of the family-based authority system also pre-
cluded differentiating wages solely according to an individual's 
output regardless of age or gender. In this environment, the 
dual influences of church and family, rather than aspects of the 
cost accounting systems, effectively sustained factory discipline. 
Economic, technological, and social factors combined to 
compel the implementation of more comprehensive costing pro-
cedures.9 The slump in the cloth market in conjunction with the 
rise in the price of cotton pressured Slater and his heirs to 
reduce costs. The adoption of the power loom in the mid 1820s 
enabled the Slater firms to employ a larger, full-time labor force 
whose output needed to be more closely monitored and mea-
sured. The work force also became more homogeneous as 
young children were gradually phased out of factories and more 
single women were hired.10 Privileges once accorded to house-
holders were eventually removed so that individuals rather than 
the family became the measurable work unit. Beginning in the 
early 1840s, each worker received his or her wages individually. 
This pay scheme contrasts with the Lowell system in which 
workers were compensated individually from the mills' incep-
tion. Professional managers in the form of factory agents also 
replaced Slater family members and became accountable for 
cost and quality [Tucker, 1981]. 
9 According to Tucker [1984, p. 223], "By the 1830s management appeared 
to be ready to sacrifice the moral discipline associated with the family and the 
church in order to obtain more extensive control over the individual worker. 
Privileges once accorded the householder in the factory came under scrutiny 
and began to be dismantled as economic forces became the primary influence in 
the actions of management." Because of "a near-perfect degree of product com-
petition from about 1835 onwards," textile manufacturers were forced to accept 
the market price for their goods [McGouldrick, 1968, p. 34]. 
10 Children were also employed in Lowell Mills, but in far fewer numbers 
than in the Slater system, primarily because of the complexity of the Lowell 
machinery [Bender, 1975]. Although the employment of children in factories 
was condemned for humanitarian reasons [Luther, 1970], economic factors 
clearly supported it. According to Ware [1966, p. 244], "The wages received by 
children seem hardly worth working for. The Troy Company paid some of its 
child workers the miserable sum of thirty-three cents a week." The first legal 
restrictions limiting child labor (three months of schooling a year were required 
for children under 15) were enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature in 1836. 
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As a result of these changes, the Slater mills eventually par-
alleled their Lowell counterparts in managerial structure, level 
of integration, and nature and regularity of the work force. Ac-
cording to Tucker [1984, p. 205], an "elemental form" of cost 
accounting was introduced (at the Slater mills) in the late 
1830s. More extensive cost management procedures had already 
been implemented in the Lowell system because certain aspects 
of its social system and work environment warranted them.11 
Lowell mill owners also relied on social institutions (church, 
family, schools, etc.) to reinforce mill discipline; however, 
unique conditions of the Lowell system (a much larger work 
force, absentee owners, greater automation, and full integra-
tion) led to the earlier use of costing procedures to supplement 
these paternalistic devices. 
The Lowell System 
The development of textile manufacturing at Waltham and 
Lowell has been described in detail [Dalzell, 1987; Gregory, 
1975; Spalding, 1969]. This study focuses on the mills that were 
built by a group of Boston merchant/entrepreneurs in Lowell, 
Massachusetts, during the 1820s and early 1830s. Other re-
searchers [Dublin, 1979; Lubar, 1983] have indicated that be-
cause of interlocking directorships and common management, 
technology, resources, and information used by one mill were 
widely known and available to others. Accordingly, "the Lowell 
system" will be the terminology used regarding procedures un-
dertaken by one or more of the Lowell mills. 
In summary, a group of successful Boston merchants (the 
Boston Associates) built the first fully integrated textile mill in 
Waltham, Massachusetts in 1814. Realizing financial success, 
they constructed a number of similar mills in Lowell, Massa-
chusetts, and other New England towns during the 1820s and 
1830s. All of the mills were organized as joint stock companies 
and were capitalized at over $500,000 in $1,000 share incre-
ments. By 1840, nine Lowell corporations operated 29 mills and 
produced over one million yards of cloth weekly; and, according 
to Montgomery [1970, p. 162], produced more yarn and cloth 
11Walsh and Stewart [forthcoming] have re-examined accounting records at 
the Slater mills and report little evidence of cost accounting before 1820. They 
also indicate that significant cost data began to appear in the mid 1830s at the 
Lowell mills; however, comparative cost reports dating from the late 1820s have 
been located and are described in this paper. 
6
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"than is produced in any other factories without exception in 
the world." 
Although ownership later expanded beyond the Boston As-
sociates, effective control was continually maintained by the 
members or their kinship networks. In accordance with Massa-
chusetts law, a treasurer was legally responsible for protecting 
corporate assets. Surviving records indicate that the treasurer 
prepared a financial report which was examined annually by 
selected stockholders who served as directors and participated 
in this and other committee activities.12 Certain treasurers, fac-
tory agents, and directors were actively involved in the opera-
tions of more than one mill and their interactions are well-docu-
mented [Gregory, 1975; Josephson, 1949]. 
From inception, operational control at each Lowell-system 
mill was delegated to a superintendent who acted as technical 
expert, and a factory agent who served as chief operations offi-
cer [Lubar, 1983]. The typical factory agent was not technically 
trained and was primarily selected for his managerial skills and 
executive ability.13 There were no middle managers per se, but 
overseers and second-hands were fully accountable to the fac-
tory agent for output and quality levels, staffing, and record 
keeping.14 According to Prude [1983, p. 83], overseers were 
members of the managerial elite, and "stood indisputably atop 
the social order of the mill compounds." The administrative 
functions and hierarchies of the Lowell mills display key char-
12 Committees were formed to regularly audit the Treasurer's books, and, as 
needed, to identify and purchase suitable mill sites, contract or set prices for 
buildings and machinery, develop procedures to cut fire risk, and determine the 
type of cloth each mill should produce. That directors and committee members 
were never compensated for these services or related expenses [Appleton, 1858] 
is overlooked by critics of the corporations' high dividend-to-earnings payout 
ratio [Dalzell, 1987; Josephson, 1949]. Dividends averaged 10.75 percent be-
tween 1825 and 1835 at the Merrimack Company [Gregory, 1975], 
13 Mill agents in 1830 included a former sea captain, prison warden, and 
school teacher. See Bagnali [1977] for a detailed description of factory agents' 
background, training, and responsibilities. Josephson [1949] suggests that fac-
tory agents were also selected for their social standing. 
14 An agreement appointing Ebenezer Hobbs as overseer and clerk at the 
Boston Manufacturing Company on April 1, 1819 reveals the expectations for 
these positions: "that he will devote to their service all his time and talents, that 
he will truly and faithfully account for all monies committed to him for the use 
of said company; that he will comply with the careful directives of the Agent in 
direction of said company" [Baker, Boston Manufacturing Company, Unbound 
Papers, Box 2-A Archives MSS:44]. 
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acteristics of managerialism that are first attributed to the 
Springfield Armory only after 1840 [Hoskin and Macve, 1988]. 
The Lowell mills differed from the Slater system in ways 
that affected the implementation and nature of cost manage-
ment. Lowell mills immediately adopted power weaving and in-
tegrated all phases of textile production under one roof.15 The 
owners needed a large, full-time work force and chose to estab-
lish a social system that made a factory life appealing to farm 
girls, would attract them to Lowell, and yet maintain factory 
discipline. In addition to large multi-story factories, the Lowell 
corporations funded the construction of boarding houses, single 
family dwellings, two churches, and a library.16 Given their mer-
cantile background, the Boston Associates were probably more 
export-oriented than their Slater counterparts and, conse-
quently, faced more direct competition from the more mature 
British mills. Restrictive tariffs protected the U.S. mills from 
British competition in the U.S. market, but export trade had to 
be played more evenly. By concentrating on fine cloths, the 
Lowell mills were able to supplant British dominance in China 
and South America, and by 1845, overseas trade had become 
more profitable than domestic commerce [Gregory, 1975]. 
Strict rules regarding many aspects of behavior were estab-
lished and generally accepted, although the level of enforcement 
varied according to the supply of labor at the time [Dublin, 
1979]. Boarding house regulations in the early 1830s include the 
requirement of attendance at public worship on the Sabbath 
and note that boarding houses "must be closed at ten o'clock, in 
the evening."17 These regulations reflect the standards and mo-
res of family life of the day [Ware, 1966] and illustrate how the 
Lowell system utilized church teachings to instill factory disci-
pline. The deterioration of factory life and the creation of a 
permanent working class culture that began in the 1840s was 
certainly not anticipated at the time the mills were established.18 
15 Textile manufacturing requires a series of separate processes to convert 
raw cotton to finished cloth. These steps include carding, dressing, bleaching, 
spinning, and weaving and are described in detail by Jeremy [1981]. All of these 
procedures were first integrated at a single large mill by the Boston Associates 
in Waltham in 1814. 
16 Baker Library, Merrimack Manufacturing Company, Vol. 1, Directors 
Meetings. 
17 "Regulations of Boarding Houses," MATH, Nathan Appleton Collection. 
18Correspondence between mill girls and their families indicates that fac-
tory work was intentionally perceived to be impermanent [Dublin, 1979]. Mill 
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COST MANAGEMENT IN THE LOWELL SYSTEM 
Accounting historians continue to push back the inaugura-
tion of cost accounting practices. Initially, they focused on the 
1880s because cost and financial accounts were not thought to 
be fully integrated until that time [Littleton, 1933; Garner, 1954; 
Chatfield, 1974]. Historians then examined the cotton textile in-
dustry and determined that integration occurred as early as 
1810 in England [Stone, 1973], and in the 1840s and 1850s in 
America [Tucker, 1981; Johnson, 1981]. When the definition of 
cost accounting is broadened to include cost management, the 
date recedes even further. For example, Johnson [1981, p. 516] 
defined cost accounting as "designed to provide financial infor-
mation for management decision-making and control." The 
most recent studies indicate that cost management practices 
were undertaken in the last third of the eighteenth century in 
the British textile and ironworks industries [Fleischman and 
Parker, 1991 and 1990]. 
Factors that warranted cost-based information were in 
place from the inception of the Lowell mills. Large, fully inte-
grated facilities faced foreign and domestic competition in mar-
kets characterized by steadily falling market prices.19 Evidence 
clearly indicates that British mill technology and costing proce-
dures were well known in the United States.20 Surviving records 
owners also preferred to keep factory work temporary, perhaps to avoid creating 
a permanent proletariat [Guttman, 1976] or duplicating the same type of factory 
work environment that existed in England [Appleton, 1858]. Mantoux [1961] 
described the horrid working conditions that existed for women and children in 
many British factories, conditions that were well known in America in the early 
1800s and were eventually approached in later years. For example, Ware [1959, 
p. 63] indicated that "by 1846 the weavers (in the U.S.) had been reduced to 'a 
state of abject misery and suffering'." 
19According to Nathan Appleton [1832, 1858], the price obtained for the 
same type of cotton sheeting fell steadily from 1816 to 1843 as follows: 
Date 
1816 
1819 
1823 
1826 
1829 
1831 
1843 
Price 
per yd. 
$.30 
.21 
.17 
.13 
.09 
.10 
.065 
20According to Gregory [1975, p. 239], "In selecting fabrics, determining 
articles to be manufactured, and assigning prices, Appleton . .. gathered a mass 
9
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also indicate that cost information was compiled and used in-
ternally and made available to corporate shareholders on a 
regular basis. Among its statistics, the Treasurer's Report [1867] 
for the Lawrence Manufacturing Company includes the cost of 
labor per pound in the Carding, Spinning, Dressing, and Weav-
ing Departments in each year dating from 1831. The report also 
contains the profits and losses and dividends declared each 
year, the cost of enlargements and improvements, and expendi-
tures incurred for ordinary repairs and renewals. Furthermore, 
costing procedures used in one mill can be attributed to the 
entire Lowell system since interlocking arrangements enabled 
the mills to function as a homogeneous group.21 
Various cost reports and procedures in the Lowell system 
have been discussed previously [Johnson, 1981; Lubar, 1984; 
Porter, 1980], but to some, the use of cost information has not 
been clearly demonstrated [Ezzamel, Hoskin, and Macve, 1990; 
Hoskin and Macve, 1988], This section describes selected cost 
reports and discusses how they helped facilitate resource alloca-
tion decisions and cost reduction efforts and why certain more 
modern accounting procedures were excluded. Considered in 
of information from varied English sources: price tags, costs of production from 
the mills, and data from his old mercantile associates abroad." In 1828, for 
example, Nathan Appleton received a letter from his brother in England describ-
ing the machinery, power requirements, and output of the W. Beavens Factory 
"which is one of the best to see, it having been in operation only three years, 
and all its machinery of the newest and most approved kinds" [MHS, Appleton 
Family Papers, Box 4, Folder 4.8]. In 1829, a letter from John Hall discussed the 
costs of operating a steam engine and mentioned that "the wear and tear, re-
pairing, including the interest may be calculated at 12 per cent per annum" 
[MHS, Appleton Family Papers, Box 4, Folder 4.11]. These letters support 
Appleton's remarks to the U.S. House of Representatives [1832a, p. 10] regard-
ing the need to know the costs of producing British textiles: 
. . . the first inquiry manufacturing makes is the original cost of the 
article with which he proposes to compete . . . does the gentleman sup-
pose that any rational man would erect a cotton mill to manufacture 
goods for exportation without ascertaining precisely what goods could 
be furnished for from Manchester?" 
21 Interlocking arrangements created a community of interest that enabled 
prices, wages, work rules and technology to be standardized throughout the 
Lowell system [Dublin, 1979; Josephson, 1949; Layer, 1955; Lubar, 1983], Far 
from being unethical, these arrangements were thought to protect society and 
the economy from destructive competition and speculation. According to Gre-
gory [1975, p. 238], "Daily they (the Boston Associates) met at noon at the 
Boston Exchange where by private, informal negotiations they borrowed 
money, planned new projects, and exchanged business information." 
10
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context with social, technical, and economic forces of the day, 
these reports appear to supply all the cost-related information 
that was needed or would be used and "provided the manage-
ment with a clear picture of the company's sources of profit and 
loss" [Spalding, 1969, p. 22]. 
Comparative Cost Reporting 
The most outstanding feature of the cost accounting reports 
from the Lowell mills is the detail of comparative cost report-
ing. Historical records reveal that cost comparisons were con-
ducted between different time periods, individual products and 
product lines, and different mills. In summary, these records 
appear to suggest that cost reporting may have been used for 
cost control purposes. Key aspects of the more noteworthy re-
ports are now discussed. 
An October 1827 report entitled "Memo of Cloth Made and 
its Cost at Lowell" provides unit and total costs for each type of 
cloth during the most recent six month period at Merrimack 
Manufacturing Company.22 The report also includes percentage 
calculations for "apparent waste" and "real waste" for each of 
the mills, suggesting that quality was regularly measured, per-
haps in comparison to quality norms. 
An October, 1828 six-month summary report entitled 
"Profit and Loss on each kind of Cloth" reports the prior six 
months' profit for each of Merrimack Manufacturing Company's 
five mills. Because each mill produced only one grade of yarn, 
profitability by product grade was determinable as well.23 An 
1830 report entitled, "Cost of each Cloth and gain in each Mill" 
provides more detail by including revenues by cloth type, direct 
costs for cotton, carding and spinning, and weaving, and a com-
mon allocation for general expenses and repairs. Total print and 
an average cost per pound and per yard of cotton is also com-
puted for each mill. Johnson [1981] and Johnson and Kaplan 
[1987] contend that the purpose of cost accounting in the nine-
teenth century cotton mills was to coordinate, control, and in-
crease the efficiency of multiple internal conversion processes, 
but not to link the financial performance in each process to 
overall profitability. Surviving summary reports indicate that 
22MHS, Appleton Family Papers, Section 4.7. 
23MHS, Appleton Family Papers, Section 4.9. 
11
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this linkage was made on a regular basis, thereby suggesting 
cost accounting's importance to ownership. 
Comparative cost reporting may have been an important 
mechanism in stimulating cost reduction and greater efficiency 
among the Lowell system mills. Regarding comparatively strong 
financial performance at the Jackson mill in 1836, for example, 
Samuel Appleton wrote that "They must wake up at the 
Appleton and try to beat them the next six months to come."24 
Common ownership, rotating management, and a common 
sales agency enabled information from different companies and 
mills to be consolidated, evaluated, and acted upon. Gregory 
[1975, p. 257, 242] summarized the impact of these shared rela-
tionships: 
Although the promoters provided the common core 
of control, through a loosely organized system of inter-
locking directorates, the companies within the system 
both competed and cooperated with each other . . . By 
pitting one company against another, it (the common 
sales agency) spurred the mills to increased production 
and efficiency. 
Unit Cost and Profit Calculations 
Accurate cost per unit information was needed to maintain 
profit margins in light of a continually falling market prices for 
finished cotton products (see footnote 19). Surviving records 
indicate that a variety of detailed cost per unit calculations were 
conducted. One report prepared in October of 1826 and entitled 
"Cost of Various Styles of Prints" provides unit cost numbers for 
13 different styles.25 The cost of "Blue and Whites", for example, 
is built up by including unit costs for four operations (bleach-
ing, printing, dipping, making up), one cost cell, (the col. room), 
and an allocation (general expense). This information could 
have been used to establish or evaluate prices and to help con-
trol inventory. The inventory of cloth on hand at the Merrimack 
Manufacturing Company on April 15, 1826 totaled $132,504 and 
was broken down into unit and total pricing for 32 different 
styles of cloth.26 
24 MHS, Appleton Family Papers, Section 5.12 
25 MHS, Appleton Family Papers, Section 4.4. 
26 MHS, Appleton Family Papers, Section 4.2. 
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An October, 1827 report entitled "Cost of Printing" details 
the total and unit costs of various operations for the prior six 
month period. The report includes nine separate operations, one 
of which is labeled General Expenses. Each operation includes a 
unique number of yards produced and separate costs for mate-
rials and labor. The left and bottom margins also contain indi-
vidual and summary unit cost notations from April 1828. This 
report suggests that unit cost information was monitored over 
time and, when used in conjunction with selling prices, could 
establish the overall profitability of printing. An 1830 factory 
agent's memo to company directors further illustrates how unit 
costs were a critical factor in allocating productive capacity 
among products and in deciding to perform work internally or 
by subcontract.27 
Miscellaneous Cost Reports 
Several other cost-based reports are noteworthy. The com-
putation of the overseer's premium at the Appleton mills in No-
vember, 1830 and a supporting memo illustrate how cost infor-
mation was used in conjunction with incentive-based labor con-
tracts.28 The premium of six mills per pound was based on ex-
ceeding a targeted (or standard) level of 10,000 pounds of good 
output from each mill per week (rejected cloth was subtracted 
from total output). A later memo indicates that annual bonuses 
were capped individually ($75 per overseer) and in total ($250 
per mill). These financial incentives certainly mustered greater 
labor productivity, but not without a social cost. Incentive-
based pay schemes may have encouraged overseers to slow 
down or set clocks back in order to obtain additional output 
from operatives [Josephson, 1949]. Incentive pay may also have 
contributed to deteriorating work conditions and the abuse ac-
corded individual operatives [Luther, 1970]. 
27 Twenty-five percent higher output prevented the bleach works at the 
Merrimack Manufacturing Company from meeting internal demand in June, 
1830. As a result, Kirk Boot, Merrimack's factory agent, reported that "We have 
attempted by reducing the quality of all work .. . but find that this is no 
economy because it not only enhances the cost of dyeing, but makes it less 
perfect." Boot proposed to "put out" the I and W cloth to bleaching to the 
Hamilton Company at $.03 a pound. "In this way doing the expensive bleaching 
only, the apparent cost will be considerably increased, but we expected the 
saving in dyeing will fully compensate us" [Baker, Merrimack Manufacturing 
Company, Volume 1 Directors Meetings, p. 89]. 
28 MATH, Nathan Appleton Collection, Section 4.101. 
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Other reports show how cost information was or could be 
used in conjunction with operational decisions. A memo pre-
pared on September 26, 1829 calculates the amount of money 
that would have been earned by 12 different classes of labor in 
the 13 weeks ending August 29 if they had been paid at then 
current prices.29 Given that prices for finished goods were fall-
ing steadily during the period, this particular cost information 
could have been used to establish the output requirements that 
were needed to maintain earlier profit levels. 
Another memo describes the output differences between 
looms operating at high speed and common speed in two mills 
over a three week period in 1831.30 The memo's author deter-
mined that "The 80 looms on high speed norm 3,083 yards more 
than the other in 18 days." Applying cost numbers to these out-
put differentials would have enabled management to determine 
the impact of wage rate adjustments on profits. 
The Absence of Methodical Depreciation 
Several researchers have criticized the Lowell cost manage-
ment system for the absence of methodical depreciation. They 
suggest a developmental deficiency by implying that the concept 
of depreciation was unknown to mill management [Hoskin and 
Macve, 1988] or that its absence was intentional and led to in-
flated profits, excessive dividends, the undercapitalization of 
facilities, and the eventual decline of the industry [Dalzell, 1987; 
Spalding, 1969]. An assessment of environmental factors, how-
ever, rationally explains depreciation's absence during this and 
later time periods [Tyson, 1990; McGaw, 1985].31 
Evidence indicates clearly that the concept of depreciation 
as loss of value was widely understood in the cotton textile in-
dustry by the early 1830s. Montgomery [1832, p. 191] included 
7.5% of machinery for "tear and wear" in calculating Profit and 
Loss per fortnight for an English textile operation. More di-
rectly, the Massachusetts legislature [Laws of the Common-
29 MATH, Appleton Papers, Section 4.98. 
30 MATH, Appleton Papers, Section 4.109. 
31 Johnson and Kaplan [1987] discuss the cost management systems em-
ployed in the steel and railroad industries and note their omission of methodical 
depreciation. Depreciation first appeared with regularity in large vertically inte-
grated firms in the early twentieth century. The reasons why Carnegie and oth-
ers did not require accounting information to monitor fixed capital in the steel 
business apply equally well to the cotton textile industry. 
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wealth, 1831] required existing corporations to provide an esti-
mate of the value of the real and personal "estate" of the Corpo-
ration.32 In response to the Act, a committee of Appleton Com-
pany directors prepared a "Statement of Cost and Value" on 
November 24, 1832. Included in the adjustments to cost are two 
items that represent depreciation: $14,944.15, "From first cost 
of Machinery" and $15,410.60, "Being 10 per cent deducted for 
difference between old and new machinery." The committee ex-
plained how they derived their "depreciation" adjustments: 
The committee have reduced in their valuation the 
property of this company used for manufacturing pur-
poses, so as to be near the value of other mills built by 
Lowell, since its establishment, and no regards has 
been (given) to the effect, that political events may have 
on this and other property of the kind.33 
As a result of the valuation, the book value of machinery 
was reduced and the residual profits adjusted accordingly. Sur-
viving records reveal that machinery valuations and book ad-
justments were performed at the Appleton Company in 1838, 
1845, 1849, and 1857, indicating that valuations were made pe-
riodically, perhaps in conjunction with new stock offerings.34 
Incomplete records preclude precise conclusions regarding the 
regularity and motivation of asset revaluations, but surviving 
records clearly demonstrate an awareness of depreciation and 
the difficulties in determining current value. In regard to deter-
mining fair value in compliance with the Massachusetts Act of 
1830, a committee of Merrimack Manufacturing Company di-
rectors wrote: 
The greatest difficulty was found in making a satis-
factory valuation of the Machinery in the 5 mills for 
spinning and weaving. In this department very consid-
erable improvements have been made and great reduc-
tions in the price of machinery since the contracts were 
32 The historical record shows that nine identical petitions, each from a 
separate county, were submitted to the legislature requesting the inclusion of a 
limited liability feature to corporate ownership. The Suffolk County petition 
contained 239 names, eight of whom were recognizable as "Boston Associates". 
The provision within the 1830 law that required the valuation of corporate 
debts, credits, and property appears to be the cost of obtaining the limited 
liability feature. 
33 MATH, Appleton Papers, Section 3.13. 
34MATH, Appleton, Section 3.15. 
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made a part of that now in use. They adopted the prin-
ciple of considering the machinery in No. 2 which is 
supposed to unite all the latest improvements, and to 
have been built at the very lowest price, as the stan-
dard.35 
There are a number of reasons why depreciation may not 
have been recorded methodically. For one, expenditures to 
maintain, renew, and improve existing machinery were all re-
corded in a Repairs account that was fully charged to income. 
Depreciation was also an uncontrollable cost that was about the 
same for all mills [Lubar, 1983] and essentially irrelevant for 
making cost comparisons. Depreciation numbers are also un-
likely to influence replacement decisions given the rapid pace of 
technological innovation at that time [McGaw, 1985]. The use of 
periodic revaluations and residual profit adjustments, in con-
junction with recapitalization, is a more direct way of funding 
fixed capital.36 In any case, the concept of depreciation and the 
need to cover the cost of fixed capital were known and under-
stood. In remarks before the House of Representatives, Nathan 
Appleton [1832b, p. 19] displayed a keen understanding of prac-
tical economics and the need to monitor costs: 
The natural price of every commodity is the cost of 
the labor, and the value of the use of the capital em-
ployed in its production. The disturbing causes are the 
relative proportion of supply and demand. Now the 
practical man watches the disturbing causes which are 
in constant action, with great indifference for the natu-
ral price. The student of political economy knows and 
cares nothing for the active disturbing causes, but sup-
poses the actual price to be always in conformity with 
the remote tendency. 
The Absence of a Fully-Developed Standard Cost System 
Researchers have recently suggested that a certain disciplin-
ary power associated with West Point training was needed be-
35 Baker, Merrimack Manufacturing Company, Vol. 1, Directors Meetings, p. 
75. 
36 The Lowell corporations originally ensured that no more than two-thirds 
of capital would be tied up in fixed assets, and that expansions would not be 
financed out of earnings; however, "In some few instances this principle has 
been disadvantageously encroached upon by increasing the original machinery 
without a proportional increase in capital" [Appleton, 1858, p. 30]. 
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fore managerialism would individualize norms of behavior, uti-
lize standard costs, and construct a work force described as "a 
cohort of calculable persons that could be managed" [Ezzamel, 
Hoskin and Macve, 1990, p. 160]. However, many other factors 
better explain why standard costs were intentionally not imple-
mented in the Lowell system during this time period.37 
For one, the lack of education and sobriety, and the pace of 
production would have prevented individual operatives from 
self-reporting production data. For example, Bagnall [1908] in-
dicated that most mechanics were addicted to alcohol. In an 
address on working conditions in New England in 1832, Luther 
[1970, p. 20] reported that "in 8 mills all on one stream, within 
a distance of two miles, we have 168 persons who can neither 
read nor write." 
In the early years at Lowell, at least through the 1820s, 
economic need was not the primary motive that brought farm 
girls to work in the mills [Dublin, 1979; Ware, 1966]. Some of 
the reasons for moving to Lowell include the desire to escape 
the boredom of the farm, the sociability of city life, opportuni-
ties for education and greater independence. Therefore, excep-
tionally stringent work rules and individualized output require-
ments in conjunction with standard costs may have led to intol-
erable levels of turnover and were thus intentionally avoided. 
According to Prude [1983], workers' voluntary terminations ac-
counted for nearly 50 per cent of the turnover between 1816 and 
1820. Mill girls' own accounts from this same time period sug-
gest that quitting behavior was a common form of protest to 
work rules and conditions perceived to be unreasonable [Dub-
lin, 1979; Josephson, 1949]. According to Ware [1966, p. 236]: 
In contrast to the starvation wage with which the 
English could obtain pauper labor, the American 
manufacturers had from the first to offer a wage which 
would entice into the mills a class of self-supporting 
farmers and mechanics, as well as girls for whom gain, 
not bread' was the motive for factory work. 
Continual innovations in technology throughout the early 
period also discouraged the development of standard costs that 
would quickly be rendered out-of-date. Instead productivity was 
37 Unfortunately, standard costs do not have a universally accepted definition 
and are often interpreted differently. This writer defines standard costs as the 
level of costs that should be. Standard costs also suggest the individualization of 
norms and the calculation of variances. 
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increased by adjusting piece rates, machine speeds, and tending 
responsibilities so that only industrious workers could earn fully 
adequate wages. Using the market to shape the cost of labor 
through piece-rate adjustments reflected rational decision mak-
ing rather than a cost accounting deficiency. 
Several noted researchers have argued that cost accounting 
was needed to control internal production processes only after 
wage contracts were substituted for market piece rates [John-
son, 1981; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987], Surviving records indi-
cate, however, that piece rates were the common form of remu-
neration at the Lowell mills long after cost management prac-
tices were initiated. For example, a September, 1829 memo en-
titled "Prices for Job Hands" identified piece rates for twelve 
different classes of labor, six of which had different rates de-
pending on the type of cloth produced.38 Dublin [1979] de-
scribes how piece-rate adjustments were effectively used to re-
duce operatives' wages in the 1860s. Englander [1987] indicates 
that piece-rate accounting, in conjunction with the inside con-
tract system of production, was used by many U.S. industries 
into the twentieth century. More research is needed to deter-
mine the impact of piece-rate accounting on standard costs, 
budgets, and other accounting procedures. Market-based piece 
rates were used by the Boston Manufacturing Company in 1814 
and by Superintendent Lee at the Springfield Armory as early as 
1819 [American State Papers, 1823]. Therefore, attributing the 
transition of piece-rate accounting into individualized norms to 
West Point managerialism appears unwarranted. 
Ezzamel, Hoskin, and Macve [1990, p. 159], in discussing 
how Daniel Tyler in 1832 at the Springfield Armory developed 
norms of what "the good worker working solidly could and 
should achieve," contend that "there appears to be no historical 
precedent for this kind of standard setting." However, Pollard 
[1965, p. 191] describes how prizes were given to the hardest 
working boy and girl, "and their output became the norm for 
the rest." Surviving records from the Lowell mills in the 1820s 
similarly show that output norms and associated piece wages 
were set according to the efforts of the most skilled workers. 
Competition within the cotton textile industry may account for 
the early development of this productivity-enhancing mechanism. 
A number of factors explain why individualized norms were 
38 MATH, Appleton Papers, Section 4.96. 
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not incorporated into standard costs during the time-frame un-
der study. Owner/managers were able to fully exchange cost and 
other labor related information; consequently, they could con-
trol costs effectively and efficiently through a uniform set of 
rules and regulations. An 1829 memo labeled "Regulations 
Agreed upon by Agents of Merrimack, Hamilton, and Appleton" 
outlines the terms of discharge and form of discharge letter to 
be issued and illustrates how blacklisting served to strengthen 
managerial control. In another example, a statement detailing 
the number of girls working, missing, and out sick on March 6, 
1841 in each of the five Lawrence mills was sent to the agent of 
the Appleton Company.39 The fact that the Lowell work force 
was predominantly female may help explain their general com-
plicity with these rules and why management was able to delay 
the use of cost accounting for control purposes.40 
Having full and certain knowledge of the costs of produc-
tion, facilitated through interlocking directorships and the ex-
change of key business data, enabled gentlemen's agreements to 
maintain consistent wage rates and regulations.41 The uniform 
marketing and pricing of finished goods by a common sales 
agency also staved off destructive price competition among the 
Lowell companies. The growth of organized labor, the increas-
ing complexity of multi-activity firms, and the inability to utilize 
piece-rate adjustments all help explain the need for standard 
costs in later years. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
To argue that Lowell costing methods were under-devel-
oped discounts the social environment of early American textile 
39 MATH, Appleton Papers, Section 4.36. 
40There were several minor work stoppages during the early 1830s at 
Lowell, but these lasted only a few days and were not widely supported. 
Guttman [1976, p. 20] quotes an unnamed source regarding the advantage of 
employing females in the mills: "Women are much more ready to follow good 
regulations, are not captious, and do not clan as the men do against the over-
seers." 
41 On January 16, 1828 the following vote was passed: "That the presidents 
be requested to communicate to the ??? Mfg. Company .. . that the practice of 
inveigling workers from other Establishments is inconsistent with the preserva-
tion of good fellowship as it is with their mutual interests [Baker Library, 
Merrimack Manufacturing Company, Vol. 1, Directors Meetings]. Empirical re-
search has shown that wages were standardized across the whole textile manu-
facturing industry [Layer, 1955]. 
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manufacturing as well as the economic factors that demanded 
that certain cost information be routinely provided to owner/ 
managers of successful businesses. To further contend that a 
particular type of managerial training was needed to enforce 
accountability or utilize accounting to its full potential ignores a 
record replete with detailed cost keeping and accountability 
procedures. Tucker [1984, p. 105], for example, relates how 
Samuel Slater monitored his work force by examining every 
piece of cloth in the early years from outworkers: 
If weavers took more than four months to complete 
their work, they were docked a half-cent a yard on the 
cloth returned, and if they failed to return all the yarn 
given out, they were charged for it and dismissed. 
The absence of certain accounting procedures is better inter-
preted as reflecting business complexities, economic pressures, 
or social forces of the day rather than as a lack of knowledge, a 
developmental deficiency, or missing a needed managerial com-
ponent. 
Perhaps strict rules, regulations, and labor costing proce-
dures were not implemented at the Springfield Armory much 
before 1840 because of the absence of a highly competitive mar-
ket, or because armory workers, being more skilled, were able 
to maintain control of work processes until that time. Ware 
[1966] and Dublin [1979] support this latter position, while 
Grimsted [1985, p. 8] seemingly refutes it: 
Whatever the differing sources of strength and vul-
nerability of various groups of skilled craftsmen and 
unskilled industrial workers in this era, they were in 
sufficiently similar situations to make use of broadly 
similar mechanisms to try to protect their interests. 
In either case, a War Department board examining practices at 
the Armory in 1841 determined that "in all the private establish-
ments which were visited by the board, the hours of labor are 
fixed by regulation" [Benet, 1878, p. 401]. The board was prob-
ably referring to the cotton mills in Lowell where operatives had 
been subject to strict industrial discipline for nearly twenty 
years. Accountability and costing systems may also have been 
utilized in other large, highly integrated, and competitive indus-
tries before 1840. According to Cochran [1981, p. 98]: 
In the years before 1820, the United States had be-
come firmly set on the road to modern industrializa-
20
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tion; twenty years later, by the standards of that day, 
the nation was industrialized. 
Surviving cost reports from the Lowell mills are compre-
hensive and mathematically exact and suggest that cost infor-
mation was regularly provided to assist in a variety of important 
decision-making areas. Although the absence of complete 
records prohibits a full understanding of cost-keeping and re-
porting practices, enough records survive for one historian to 
conclude that Lowell owner/managers were "pioneers in the de-
velopment of business accounting procedures in the decades be-
fore the Civil War" [Dublin, 1979, p. 25]. One can safely con-
clude that systematic cost-keeping procedures were present and 
well-utilized in the United States before 1840. 
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